From Paris to Berlin, ballot boxes across Europe are registering a quiet but profound shift. Parties once dismissed as unorthodox are now shaping national debates, rewriting coalitions, and challenging the European Union. The rise of the far-right in Europe is no longer a marginal phenomenon – it is now an ongoing trend, raising urgent questions about democracy, identity and the future of Europe.
Following the end of World War II, far-right groups in Europe were heavily discredited, due to their association with the horrors of Nazism and Mussolini, and many struggled to gain significant traction outside fringe groups. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created a propitious climate for the rise of the European far-right once again. As borders opened again, migration to the West soared, increasing from around 1,250,000 to 2,500,000 in two years, as well as unleashing a period of economic uncertainty and weakened institutions. In the early 1990s, most of Europe fell into a deep recession, with the Baltics facing negative GDP growth of 25%, and often, this was accompanied by high inflation and gaping fiscal deficits. Far-right parties during this time also began to abandon the old fascist models of the early 20th century, and adapted to the socio-economic environment of that period. Many parties, including the National Front in France, Northern League in Italy, and the Freedom Party of Austria, embraced populist nationalism, swapping anti-communism for anti-immigration and anti-globalisation, and economically, adopted the ideology of welfare chauvinism – a political concept where a welfare state exists, but only restricted to a country’s ‘own’ citizens, or ‘natives’. Together, these political shifts and crises provided fertile ground for far-right groups to reestablish themselves within Europe, transforming from discredited fringes of post-war politics into influential forces that capitalised on public discontent.
How Cultural Shifts Are Driving the Far-Right Surge
Beneath Europe’s political upheavals lies a cultural tension: the struggle between cosmopolitanism and traditionalism, which has fuelled the far right’s appeal across the continent. This becomes especially clear when examining the consequences of the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe. Nearly 1.3 million people filed for asylum in EU countries in 2015, compared to the 562,680 during the previous year, almost a 125% increase. At the same time, many far-right leaders portrayed open borders as both a security threat and a cultural challenge, using slogans that emphasised protection, control, and national identity. By tapping into such grievances, while simultaneously offering a simple narrative of national rebirth, far-right parties with anti-immigration agendas gained considerable support in many of the countries that experienced significant refugee inflows. Upper Austria illustrates this dynamic particularly clearly, as the region experienced the refugee crisis in two distinct ways. Many refugees crossed Austria in 2015 along the Western Balkan Route on their way to Germany, directly impacting local municipalities. In addition, over 116,000 refugees applied for asylum in Austria in 2014 and 2015, intensifying the overall influx. As shown, in Upper Austrian state elections in 2015, the far-right Freedom Party of Austria doubled its vote share from 2009, and obtained over 30% of the vote with their fierce anti-asylum campaign. Upper Austria was no exception in Europe. Sweden had faced an increase of 108% in refugees from 2014 to 2015, and the Sweden Democrats polled around 20% of votes in late 2015, during the peak of the refugee inflow. Similarly, in Germany, despite being founded only in 2013, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) were able to increase support of up to 15%, following a 155% increase in asylum seekers from 2014 to 2015. The close correlation in timing suggests a positive relationship between the increase in the number of asylum seekers and support for far-right parties, highlighting how cultural and identity-based fears can intersect with political mobilisation.
The Leave Campaign in 2016 in the United Kingdom further legitimised far-right narratives, normalising principles such as hostility towards immigration, nationalism, and sovereignty, accelerating a trend already seen in the EU and the USA. Dr George Newth from the University of Bath states that ‘Brexit campaigning helped the far-right push their agenda into the mainstream.’. Rishi Sunak’s ‘Stop the Boats’ campaign and the controversial Rwanda policy illustrate how mainstream politics has now adopted the language once confined to the far-right. The policy, which sought to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda for offshore processing, was framed as a measure to ‘regain control’ of Britain’s borders, yet this rhetoric closely mirrors far-right ‘repatriation’ campaigns across Europe, such as those advocated by Le Pan’s National Rally, portraying immigration as a direct threat to national identity and cohesion. By normalising exclusionary narratives under the guise of pragmatism, such policies blur the line between centrist governance and far-right populism, legitimising the latter’s political agenda within mainstream discourse. The aftermath of Brexit has seen the resurgence of a ‘New Britannia’ narrative, rooted in the nostalgia for sovereignty and national self-determination, increasingly aligned with the nationalist rhetoric that emphasises cultural identity and border control.
This renewal of nationalism has provided fertile ground for far-right movements to reposition themselves into mainstream politics. Nigel Farage’s new party, Reform UK, infamous for their anti-immigration sentiment, where they have advocated to deport asylum seekers, abolishing indefinite leave to remain, and leaving the European Convention on Human Rights, is now leading polls at 31%, 10 percentage points ahead of the current government. This surge clearly reflects a post-Brexit political climate in which nationalist and sovereignty-driven narratives have gained mainstream traction, with immigration and control over borders becoming central to public debate. Beyond electoral politics, fringe extremists have also been emboldened. Thomas Mair’s murder of Labour MP Jo Cox shortly before the Brexit referendum, the planned assassination of Rosie Cooper by the far-right group National Action, which has now been classed as a terrorist group, and the rise of figures like Tommy Robinson all reflect how Brexit-era nationalism has legitimised expressions of hate and xenophobia that once lay on the political fringes. A striking manifestation of this shift has been the proliferation of English flags – once symbols of national pride, they have increasingly become associated with exclusionary nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment. This signals how nationalist symbolism has been co-opted to legitimise far-right agendas. Ultimately, Brexit provided the potent platform for nationalist rhetoric, framing immigration, sovereignty and identity as central issues for the future of the United Kingdom.
How Economic Pressures Fuelled the Far-Right Surge
Economic instability has also become a key breeding ground for far-right politics, with economic crises and rising inequalities driving voters toward radical alternatives with the promise of protection, control, and a return to national prosperity. The rise of far-right politics was furthered during the 2008 Financial Crisis, as heightened experiences of insecurity and inequality drove more people to seek out radical alternatives. This can be particularly evident in Greece, as demonstrated by the racist and neo-Nazi organisation, Golden Dawn, which founded in the 1980s. When the financial crisis spread to Europe in 2009, Greece was one of the first countries affected, with a weak economy and soaring public debt, facing unemployment rates of 25%, and a significant drop in standard of living, where more than three million were faced with a mere 300 Euros a month. Undoubtedly, this led to a fall in confidence in both the Greek government, which was the New Democracy Party at the time, and the EU, where 88% of Greeks believed that politics was failing in their country. The Golden Dawn subsequently benefited from this collapse of institutional trust. Whilst it had only gained 0.29% of the vote in the 2009 elections, it quickly rose to 6.97% in May 2012, allowing them to enter into the Greek Parliament, securing 18 seats. Despite the party’s violence towards immigrants, minorities, political opponents and LGBTQ+ groups, they quickly rose to popularity, adopting the motto of ‘Greece belongs to Greeks’. Similarly, in Hungary, household debt rose by 4% of pre-crisis national GDP, meanwhile support for the far-right grew by around 18 percentage points between 2006 to 2014. This demonstrates the significant impact the 2008 Financial Crisis had on the rise of far-right parties, as economic hardship eroded trust in mainstream parties, allowing the far-right to capitalise on such economic frustration, presenting themselves as the anti-establishment defenders of ‘ordinary people’.
The mismanagement of globalisation, shown through rising inequalities globally, also played a role in the rise of far-right politics. This was made clear in the French election of 2022, where voters had to make the decision between the centrist ruling presidential party of Emmanuel Macron, and the far-right party National Rally Party represented by Marine Le Pen. It is first crucial to understand Macron’s policies, which have been criticised for exacerbating inequalities, and failing to address the challenges posed by globalisation. His labour market reforms, aimed to increase flexibility for employers, have been criticised for undermining jobs, security and workers’ rights. Macron’s approach to globalisation has also been seen as favouring multinational corporations over domestic welfare, leading to a sense of disillusionment among many citizens. In 2018, in an attempt to attract investment and stimulate economic growth, Macron abolished the wealth tax, and corporate tax rates were gradually reduced from 33.3% to 25%. Not only did these reforms fail to deliver a boost to the French economy, many perceived them to disproportionately benefit the wealthy, fuelling resentment towards Macron’s governance. The voting patterns in Île-de-France reflect how economic inequality influences political preferences. Macron’s strongest support (61.2-79.7%) came from wealthier communes with median incomes between €28,263 and €46,280, whereas Le Pen’s backing (48.3-76.2%) was concentrated in lower-income communes with median incomes between €13,810 and €23,800. This reflects the broader divide between metropolitan centres and peripheral areas – wealthier, urban populations closer to Paris tend to favour pro-globalisation, centrist policies, whereas lower-income, ruralvoters, likely more exposed to job insecurity and the rising pressures of living costs, are more receptive to Le Pen’s populist, anti-establishment ideologies. The spatial concentration of her vote in the east of the region underlines how structural disparities in income and opportunity can drive political polarisation, fueling support for far-right parties.
The rise of the far-right across Europe reflects a complex interplay of economic discontent, cultural anxiety, and political mismanagement. From the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis to the transformative impacts of Brexit, economic instability and perceived threats to national identity have eroded trust in centrist politics, creating the breeding ground for populist far-right groups. This convergence of economic grievances and cultural insecurities suggests that the far-right’s rise is not a temporary phenomenon, but a structural shift that will continue to shape Europe’s political landscape, posing profound challenges to democracy, unity, and the future of Europe.
Written by Kelly Ng
